therefore V c B(V). Conversely, from any pair (q, u) admissible with respect to V, construct an S.E. as follows: the first period action profile specified by the S.E. is q, and the continuation equilibrium induced after any first period signal p is some S.E. o-(p) having value u(p) (by the definition of V, u(p) E V implies the existence of an S.E. o-(p) with value u(p)). It is straightforward to check that the profile constructed is indeed an S.E., therefore B(V) c V. We conclude that V= B(V), which is the content of Theorem 2 of Section 3. This result is referred to as "factorization" because it follows from the factorization or decomposition (in dynamic programming fashion) of an equilibrium into an admissible pair.
Although factorization proves to have a number of applications, much more can be said about V by studying admissible pairs in a broader context. For an arbitrary set W c RN, a pair (q, u) is admissible with respect to W if it satisfies the relevant incentive constraints as above, and for all signal values p, u(p) E W.
The set of all values of pairs admissible with respect to W is called B(W).
Notice that the elements of B(W) are "generated" by reward functions that draw values from W, just as elements of V are generated by continuation reward functions that draw values from V itself. Any set W such that W c B(W) is called self-generating (as all elements of W can be generated using rewards from W). Theorem 1 of Section 3 establishes that if W is a bounded, self-generating set, then B(W) c V. This result, which implies that all the values in any bounded self-generating set are sequential equilibrium values, is called self-generation. An informal treatment of the argument is deferred until Section 3.
Factorization and self-generation generalize theorems established in APS for symmetric equilibria of symmetric games. Some of their theoretical applications are illustrated in what follows; for instance, self-generation permits a general proof that the value set, expressed in average terms, is increasing in the discount factor (see Section 6). But self-generation is also of practical use in studying specific examples. It is sometimes relatively simple to choose a set of points in RN and show that they constitute a self-generating set for the supergame under investigation. Then one has established that each of the points is the payoff of some sequential equilibrium of the infinite horizon game.
Theorem 3 asserts that for any pair (q, ) admissible with respect to a compact set W, there exists u such that (q, u) has the same value as the original pair, and is admissible with respect to ext W (the extreme points of the convex hull of W). As Section 4 explains, this allows a major simplification of supergame equilibria: without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to S.E.'s whose continuation values, after any history, are extreme points of V. If V is a rectangle, for example, after the first period at most four continuation values and four associated action profiles arise in equilibrium. A corresponding "bang-bang" result for symmetric equilibria is found in APS. If one generalized the argument of APS to asymmetric equilibria, the result would be weaker. Namely, continuation equilibria may be taken to be boundary points of V, but not necessarily extreme points of V. The distinction is at times critical: in the 2-person rectangular example just mentioned, V has a continuum of boundary points, but only four extreme points. Our proof of the stronger result is a straightforward application of a technical theorem of Aumann (1965) .
The result that it is sufficient to consider reward functions of the bang-bang form is open to objections concerning the appropriateness of the restriction. If the "natural" solution were a smooth function, which could be replaced by one with the bang-bang property at the cost of creating a complex pattern of rapid alternations among extremal values, one kind of simplicity would be traded against another. Reassurance is provided by a much stronger characterization, new to this paper, in Section 7. Under certain conditions, the reward functions faced by players in Pareto-efficient equilibria must be bang-bang: efficiency demands that nonextremal points of the payoff set are never used.
The dynamic programming technique of value iteration (Howard (1960) ) has an analogue in repeated games which is discussed in Section 5. It is an iterative procedure for computing the set of equilibrium values. The novelty here is the presence of sequential incentive constraints and the fact that the map that is iterated is set-valued. Apart from its importance for the numerical computation of equilibria of specific supergames, the algorithm is an alternative characterization of the equilibrium value set, and as such will have a variety of theoretical applications. Suppose that for any WCRN, one is able to compute B(W) (this may be a substantial task). The algorithm works as follows. Begin with a compact set W0 sufficiently large that it is known a priori to satisfy V c B(WO) c W0. Apply the operator B repeatedly to obtain the decreasing sequence of sets {Wnln}==0, where for each n, Wn+1 = B(Wn). Theorem 5 shows that this sequence converges to the supergame value set V. The relationship to some earlier results by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) linking infinite and finite horizon games is explained briefly in Section 5.
The ways in which this paper furthers the research reported in APS may be summarized as follows. First, it relaxes the restriction of symmetry, showing the theory capable of embracing both asymmetric equilibria of symmetric games and arbitrary asymmetric games. Secondly, the sufficiency of using bang-bang reward functions in efficiently collusive equilibria is strengthened to a necessity theorem. Finally, we provide an algorithm useful in computing the sequential equilibrium value set.
Except for Section 6, this paper takes the discount factor a to be fixed, and studies the value set and the nature of constrained efficient equilibria for that degree of patience. In this way it complements the literature initiated by Radner (1985) is an expected value. Payoffs actually received 7-i(p, qi), are stochastic and depend on realizations of a random variable P which takes values in 12 c R . The distribution of P is parameterized by the vector of actions q E S, and is denoted '(I; q). Realized payoffs 7i depend on q-i.= (q , . * qi-1, qi+ . .. ,qN) only through the effect of the latter on the distribution of P. Finally, Hn(q) = JQ vi(p, qi) I!(dp; q).
The Repeated Game
We denote by G'(8) the infinitely repeated game with component game G and discount factor 8 E (0, 1). Players can observe (and therefore condition upon) only their own past actions and past realizations of the random variable P. Hence, a strategy (i for player i in G'(8) is a sequence of Lebesgue measurable functions {oi((t)}= 1, where (i(1) e Si, and for t > 1, oi(t): Qt-1 x Si-1 S.. Let pt = (p(l) ... , p(t)) and qt = (q(l),.. ., q(t)) denote t-period signal and action histories, respectively. As is standard ar:pt,qt denotes the strategy profile induced by o-after the t-period history (pt, qt). In each period, p is drawn independently according to the distribution W(; q). Associated with any strategy profile o-of G'(8) is a stochastic stream of payoff vectors. The expected present discounted value of this stream is denoted v(r) = (v1(V ), .. ., vN(&r)). Note for later use that period t payoffs are received at the end of period t and discounted to the beginning of period 1. We assume that: G has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Without loss of generality we take n to equal {p I g(p; q) > 0).
DILIP ABREU, DAVID PEARCE, AND ENNIO STACCHETrI
Assumptions (Al) and (A4) guarantee that v(oS) is well defined. Theorems 3 and 7 depend upon (A2). The solution concept used is the natural generalization of sequential equilibrium4 (see Kreps and Wilson (1982) ) to the repeated games under consideration. Hereafter, we use S.E. to denote a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies, and denote by V:= {v(o-) I o is an S.E.1 the set of S.E. payoffs. Assumption (A5) implies that V is nonempty; the strategy profile specifying that in every period independently of the history each player uses his one-period Nash equilibrium action, is an S.E. Further discussion of the assumptions is deferred until Section 3.
FACTORIZATION AND SELF-GENERATION
Consider the maximization problem faced by a player in the first period of an equilibrium a-. Recall that his choice of action qi has two consequences: it affects payoffs in period 1, and also influences the distribution of the first-period signal p(l). The player is in effect maximizing the sum of current payoffs and the expectation of the future reward (a function of p(l)) implicitly "promised" by v. The reward function must be drawn from V: an S.E. can offer only S.E. rewards. Furthermore, vi(1) must yield at least as high a value of the sum as any other action available to i. The same remarks apply to player i's choice after any t-period history.
We proceed rather abstractly by studying structures suggested by the above observations but no longer in the context of any particular equilibrium. 4The original definition applies to finite extensive games. In our usage, a sequential equilibrium will be a pure strategy profile o, such that for each player i, each t-period history q/ of actions by i, every supergame strategy 5ic for i, almost every t-period signal history pt, and the t-period history of action profiles qt i for players other than i induced by or and pt, That admissibility successfully captures the information essential for studying V is evidenced in Theorems 1 (self-generation) and 2 (factorization). These combine to say that V is the largest bounded fixed point of the set-valued map B. This is a powerful result insofar as the definition of B is quite simple and makes no reference to the complex strategic structure of an infinite horizon game.
The proofs of the theorems below are very similar to those presented for the symmetric case in APS. We have included them to provide a self-contained treatment. Before giving a proof, we provide an intuitive discussion of self-generation; for simplicity, qualifications such as "almost everywhere" are ignored. If a bounded set W is self-generating, any value in W is also in its image B(W). This permits us to choose any element of B(W) and "transform" it period-by-period into an S.E., say o-, having the same value. Begin by choosing a pair (q, u) admissible with respect to W, with value w. Set ov(1) = q. For any p E 2, we would like to ensure a continuation value of u(p) in equilibrium. As a first step, select a pair (q', u') admissible with respect to W, and having value u(p) (this is possible because u(p) E WcB(W)). Set the action profile in period 2 (given that p arose in the first period) equal to q', and for each p' E Q2 choose a new admissible pair (q", u") with value u'(p'). In this way strategies for the first t periods (for any t) are generated. A recursive step allows this process to determine a complete supergame profile ov. The profile has the desired value w, because each time an admissible pair was substituted for a continuation value, the value was preserved. Moreover the action and reward function after each history comprise an admissible pair by construction, so no player has a profitable "one-shot" deviation. Backward induction then implies that no deviations at a finite number of information sets can benefit a player. Finally, the fact that period t payoffs are bounded and are discounted heavily if t is large, implies that cheating infinitely often is unprofitable (otherwise, some deviation at a finite number of information sets would also be profitable). Q.E.D.
REMARK:
The assumption of constant support (A3) implies that all possible price histories occur in equilibrium. As a consequence, there is no material difference between Nash and sequential equilibria. For each Nash equilibrium there is a payoff-equivalent sequential equilibrium which (modulo events of measure zero) differs from the former only after histories corresponding to a player's own deviations. Both strategy profiles hence generate the same equilibrium behavior.
The next result can be viewed as a strategic, set-valued expression of Bellman's equation.
THEOREM 2 (Factorization): V= B(V).
PROOF: By Theorem 1, it suffices to establish that V is a bounded Borel set and that V c B(V). We first show that V is self-generating. Consider w E V and an S.E. oa such that v(() = w. Let (q, u) be a pair such that q =c(1) and u(p) = v(o,lp, (l)) for all p E Q2. We must prove that (q, u) is admissible with respect to V, and that E(q; u) = w. Observe that u is Lebesgue measurable, since it may be written as the discounted sum of Lebesgue measurable functions.5 Clearly,
- (1)) dp] =E(q; u).
By ( Note that V c [8/(1 -S)]co{HI(q)I q E S} (co := convex hull). Since S is finite, this implies that V is bounded. We defer proving that V is a Borel set; this will be an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.
Q.E.D.
Take the self-generating set W in the statement of Theorem 1 to be V. It is worth noting that for any w E V, the profile (T(w) constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is a sequential equilibrium in which no player conditions his choice of action in any period on actions he has previously taken.
In establishing that V c B(V), the proof of Theorem 2 constructs pairs admissible with respect to V that mimic the first-period incentive structure of an S.E. That this is possible depends on the fact that equilibrium continuation values after the first period are elements of V. This accounts for some limitations in the scope of our inquiry. First, mixed strategies are excluded from consideration. If players randomize in the first period, player 1 cannot infer (from the signal and the equilibrium hypothesis) what other players' continuation strategies are: player 2's continuation strategy may depend on his first-period action, which is unobservable to 1, and is no longer specified deterministically by the S.E. The same problem arises in models in which players observe private SThat is, u(p) = El>3 t-'Eta(7(p(0, q(t)) IP(l)= p), where E?'(7r(p(t),q(t))jp(l) =p) is the conditional expectation of players' payoffs in period t, when they follow the strategy profile r, given that the first period signal realization is p(l) = p. signals: because they are conditioning their actions on information that is not publicly observed, players cannot compute one another's continuation strategies. Continuation profiles need not be equilibria; the link between sequential equilibria and admissibility with respect to V is broken. (By assuming that player i's payoff is determined by his own action and the publicly observed signal, we ensure that payoffs do not serve as privately observed signals.) Finally, we assume in Section 2 that the support of the signal is independent of the action profile. Suppose, instead, that there are three players who, in the first period of an S.E. o-, are supposed to play the profile q, and that some value p is outside the support of the signal, given q. If player 3 cheats and p arises, player 1 concludes that either player 2 or player 3 deviated; suppose that his posterior gives equal weight to both alternatives. Similarly, suppose player 2 gives equal weight to the possibilities that 1 or 3 deviated. The continuation profile need not be an equilibrium; moreover, the continuation value for player 3 might now be worse than his least-preferred S.E. value. Consequently a pair admissible with respect to V is unable to match the severity with which o-punishes the deviation by player 3. In this case VX B(V). )(p(1))) ). When p(2) is observed, a new reward function comes into effect, and so on. Since after any t-period history, players' future payoffs are in ext V, a play of the game can be viewed as an alternation among extreme points of V, where the particular pattern of extreme points is determined by the sequence of realized outcomes of the random signal. For the special case in which V is one-dimensional (as it is, for example, when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria of symmetric games), this means that only two extreme points, and hence two action profiles, ever arise after the first period of the game. 
BANG-BANG REWARD FUNCTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF

-8)]co H(S) = W. Furthermore, if (q, u) is admissible with respect to W, E(q; u) = {IH(q) + [a/(1 -8)]x} = [a/(1 -8)]{(1 -)II(q) + =x}= w for some x E co H(S), which implies w E W.
COMPARATIVE STATICS: MONOTONICITY IN 8
Intuition suggests that the equilibrium set should in some sense increase with the discount factor. Plausibly "cooperation" becomes easier as players become more patient and thereby increasingly willing to forego immediate gains for a possible future reward. One is led to conjecture a monotonic relationship between equilibrium outcomes and the number 8, where outcomes are thought of as average discounted payoffs. Despite the complexity and generality of the model, this conjecture can be proved correct without invoking any assumptions beyond those of Theorem 3. When the discount factor increases from 81 to 82, and payoffs are appropriately normalized, the original set of equilibrium values is contained in the new set of values associated with 82. The proof is short and simple and illustrates the power of self-generation as an analytical tool.
We now write V(a), B(WI 8), and E(q; u I8) to make explicit the dependence on the particular value of the discount factor. 3 and self-generation, (1 + k)V(51) c VG32) . Q.E.D.
OPTIMIZATION AND THE NECESSITY OF BANG-BANG REWARD FUNCTIONS
This section explores the idea that efficient incentive schemes must necessarily have a bang-bang structure. Consider WCRN compact and some qe S which is the first element of an admissible pair yielding an extremal payoff in the set B(W). An implication of Theorem 3 is that among the reward functions which support q and maximize a linear function of player payoffs, at least one has the bang-bang property. We show here that under certain conditions all optimal solutions must be bang-bang. The proof takes a dual approach to the optimization problem which highlights the way in which considerations of efficiency lead to the use of rewards that are extreme points of V (or, more generally, of the compact set W from which rewards are to be drawn).
Establishing ( J e(p, A) dp, x -y> = (a, x -y>, where the last equality was established above. Hence, a I F(-q, W), contradicting (iv).
Q.E.D.
Condition (i) of Theorem 7 is a technical assumption that facilitates the dual line of proof we pursue. It is used to guarantee that the function ( (p, A), x -y> appearing near the end of the proof is analytic. This immediately implies that the function either has isolated zeroes, or is zero everywhere. Conditions (ii), (iii), and (iv) are stated in terms of restrictions on endogenous entities. Although ideally one would like to make assumptions on primitives (see the Corollary following Lemma 6), we think the theorem is broadly applicable because the conditions will arguably "often" be satisfied. When the set W is taken to be the equilibrium value set V, the Slater constraint qualification (condition (ii)) and condition (iv) hold generically in senses made precise by Lemmas 5 and 6. We do not have an analogous result for condition (iii), but as footnote 5 explains, (iii) is satisfied in all two-person games, or for any value set that is of no more than two dimensions. We remark that Theorem 7 does not apply to games with finite signal spaces.
Condition (iv) serves to exclude exceptional cases such as the following. Suppose that for signals in some set DO of positive measure, a reward function u supporting q optimally with respect to a takes on values in some face F of W. (For simplicity, the reader might think of the extreme case where W consists of a single face.) Consider another function u' supporting q, which on f2D also takes on values in F, and coincides with u elsewhere. Such a u' will typically exist, as there will be many ways to satisfy the incentive constraints. If a happens to be perpendicular to F, u' yields the same value of the objective function as does u, and hence is a distinct solution to the optimization problem. Any nondegenerate convex combination u of u and u' is also an optimal solution. Of course, u fails to have the bang-bang property.
To understand the precise sense in which the Slater constraint qualification is satisfied generically, consider the following notation. For each q E S, let 8(q):= inf{8 q is supportable by V (8) One sees in the proof of Theorem 7 that the reward function that supports a given q E S optimally for some welfare weights is essentially unique. Another implication of the necessity result is that in the analysis of strongly symmetric equilibria of symmetric repeated games, the maximum of the value set will be strictly lowered if punishment severity is reduced. In a finite action Green-Porter model, for example, losses will result from restricting attention to punishments no worse than "Cournot-Nash reversion." Even if this restriction is imposed (perhaps for considerations of simplicity), it is best to use punishments involving permanent reversion, rather than temporary reversion followed by resumed cooperation (take the set W in Theorem 7 to be the correspondingly restricted equilibrium value set). If in a particular example one requires the criterion for punishment to be a "tail test" when this is in fact inappropriate, a moderate punishment value may be constrained optimal; this explains the interior solutions for reversion time reported for certain cases in Porter (1983) . Notice that in models having value sets of higher dimension, payoffs can be extremal without being in any sense severe.
Finally, observe that an immediate implication of Theorem 7, footnote 5, and Lemmas 5 and 6 is the following result expressed in terms of primitives.
COROLLARY:
In a two player game, let q E S and suppose 8 0 8(q), g(; q) is analytic, and that {g(; q)} U {gQ-; y, q_j)Iy E Si\{qi}, i = 1, 2} is linearly independent. Then for almost all aE ERN, if u E argmin{(a, E(q, u)> I(q, u) is admissible w.r.t. V(6)}, then u has the bang-bang property.
CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this paper has been to contribute to the foundations of a systematic theory of repeated discounted games with imperfect monitoring. The results suggest that ultimately a fairly tractable and satisfying theory will emerge. Already available for a broad class of these games are powerful characterizations of the equilibrium value set, a variety of results on the nature of implicit reward functions generated by extremal equilibria, and comparative static and computational theorems. In addition, the limiting case as a approaches 1 is particularly well understood as a result of the folk theorem literature mentioned in the Introduction. While some of our theorems, notably the bang-bang principle, specifically address the problems caused by imperfect monitoring, those in Section 3 (and, with appropriate qualifications, Sections 5 and 6) apply also to games with perfect monitoring. Not yet covered are hybrid cases falling between models with perfect monitoring and those having a publicly observed random signal with constant support. Also awaiting study are mixed strategy equilibria of repeated discounted games. These problems deserve much attention. 
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Genericity Results for Section 7
We show that under the following assumption on the density functions g, each q E S satisfies the Slater constraint qualification with respect to V(a) for all a > 3(q).
(LI) The collection {g(; q)} U {g(; y, q_-)Ily E Si \{qi}, i = 1.., N} is linearly independent.8 For each q E S, a E (0, 1), and partition {Ik}/= 1 of 12, let S,* = Si \ {qi}, and gk = g(p; q) dp, k =1. K; gzk f g(p; y, q) dp, k= 1. K;-,y eS?';i eJ(V(6)); 
